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anta’s Nyāyamañjarī, and, in the hypotheses explored in this paper, also the
conceptual basis of Jayanta’s textual re-use. The sixth chapter of the Nyāyamañjarī










sa¯, and Nya¯ya sources are here surveyed and analyzed,
with a focus on their meaning and on the context. The method of analysis is partially
following Moravcsik’s scheme for a classification of citations, as well as Small’s
classification by symbolic functions. By re-using texts Jayanta not only imparted
authority to his own arguments, but also reassessed the relation of his tradition with
other ones. Re-used ideas and words stand for symbols of those authors’ tenets, and
those authors represent symbols of their respective traditions. Moreover, by quoting
a certain author Jayanta often anointed him with a symbolic status of trustworthy
authority, and his statement with a status of śabdapramāṇa.
Keywords Jayanta · Nyāyamañjarī · Citations · Textual re-use ·
Verbal testimony · Śabda
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a Jayanta and the Nyāyamañjarī (NM)
The Nyāyamañjarī (henceforth NM) is a treatise on the tenets of Nya¯ya, the system
of epistemology, dialectics and logic traditionally rooted in the Nyāyasūtra (NS). It




a Jayanta in the ninth century CE.1
The NM is composed of 12 chapters. In NM 3 to 6, about one third of the
whole work, Jayanta examines in depth the epistemology of śabda (on this term, see
Sect. 2). The present paper is grounded on a survey of a selection of re-use of texts
in the sphoṭa section of NM 6. By “re-use” I mean the adoption of previously
existing textual passages and ideas, as a general and widely encompassing term.
Verbatim re-use will be here called “quotation”, in cases where I am confident that
Jayanta is consciously quoting existing texts.
This particular section of the NM consists of an investigation on the aetiology of





sa¯ schools. There are three main reasons behind the choice of this particular
section: first, my critical edition of this portion, based on all the available
manuscripts,2 is at an advanced stage, so its text is for the purposes of this paper
more reliable than that of other parts of the NM; secondly, with a well structured
sequence of arguments and counter-arguments, such as that of this section of the
NM, it is easier to assess the function of textual re-use in Jayanta’s system; thirdly,
in the course of the editing process, I had already identified a significant amount of
re-used passages and their sources, which allows me to invest time and energy in
evaluating re-uses, rather than in tracing them.
1.2 Truth-Values, Epistemic Function, and Symbolic Effect of Re-used Texts
In the analysis and classification I will mostly focus on the quality and the context of
re-uses. Following in part the scheme for a classification of citations devised by
Moravcsik and Poovanalingam (1975) and the classification by symbolic functions,
introduced by Small (1978), I will classify re-uses in the NM by asking the
following questions about Jayanta’s intentions:
(1) Truth value: Is the re-use confirmatory or negational? In other words, did
Jayanta consider the re-used passage true or false?
(2) Symbolic value: Which tradition, author, or idea does the re-used text stand
for?
Moravcsik and Poovanalingam (1975, p. 88) envision four dichotomies in their
scheme: (1) conceptual/operational, (2) organic/perfunctory, (3) evolutionary/
juxtapositional, (4) confirmatory/negational. Of these four, (1) is ignored here,









a, see Slaje (1986, p. 245 ff.), Potter (1995, pp. 345–346), Dezso˝ (2005, Introduction), Kataoka
(2007), Slaje (2012).
2 For a list and description of extant NM manuscripts, see Graheli (2012a).
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since it is specific to the natural sciences. (2) and (3) would both be relevant, but for
want of space they will need to be addressed elsewhere. (4) is here discussed and
implemented in terms of truth-value.
As for the symbolic function, it was introduced by Small (1978, p. 328):
[Previous] studies have missed the role citations play as symbols of concepts
or methods. This cognitive function arises from the formal requirement
imposed on the scientist-author of embedding his references to earlier
literature in a written text. This leads to the citing of works which embody
ideas the author is discussing. The cited documents become, then, in a more
general sense, ‘symbols’ for these ideas.
[…] In the tradition of scholarship, the references are the ‘sources’ which the
author draws upon to give further meaning to his text. Reversing this view, as I
am suggesting here, the author is imparting meaning to his ‘sources’ by citing
them.
[…] In general, [by ‘symbolic’] I mean that an object ‘stands for’ an idea; for
citations, the cited document is the ‘object’ and the ‘idea’ is expressed in the
text which cites it.
When applied to the re-use of texts in the NM, the term “symbolic” can
encompass at least three different levels, the first two intended by the author, the
third probably accidental:3
● By re-using texts, Jayanta not only imparted authority to his own arguments, but
also reassessed the relation of his tradition with other ones. Re-used ideas and
words stand for symbols of those authors’ tenets, and those authors represent
symbols of their respective traditions.
● By quoting a certain author Jayanta may intend to assign him a symbolic status
of trustworthy authority (āpta), and to his statement a status of śabdapramāṇa.
● By arranging textual passages in a new order (see Sect. 4), Jayanta endowed
them with new meanings.
While analyzing the context and the structure of re-uses, I will therefore try to
identify the tradition, author, and concept symbolized by the cited text.
1.3 Contents of this Paper
The epistemology of śabda is not only the subject matter of NM 6, but also, in the
hypotheses explored in this paper, the conceptual basis of Jayanta’s re-use of
sources. Therefore, in Sect. 2 a brief sketch of the epistemology of śabda is
provided.
In the sphoṭa section of NM 6 Jayanta hardly ever re-uses material from his own
tradition. The reasons behind this absence of Nya¯ya sources are explored in Sect. 3.
3 A concise yet exhaustive survey on the use of the term “symbol” can be found in Eco (1996, pp. 199–
225). Symbols as “linguistic signs which are conventional and arbitrary” (see pp. 210–211), according to
Eco already used by Aristotle in a similar sense, seem particularly relevant in the present application of
the NM.
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Further clues about Jayanta’s attitude in relation to his own tradition can be
derived from some introductory verses of the NM. The most relevant passages are
examined in Sect. 4.
Section 5 is a synopsis of the structure of sphoṭa section of NM 6, needed to
facilitate the comprehension of my analysis of the style and the epistemic value of





sakas. Accordingly, in Sects. 7 and 8,
textual re-uses in the whole sphoṭa section are surveyed in two distinct parts.
For a more exhaustive assessment of Jayanta’s modality of re-use, I decided to




a sources with that of Nya¯ya ones,
and since Nya¯ya sources are almost absent in NM 6, in Sect. 9 some NS and NBh re-
uses from other parts of the NM are also examined.
2 The Epistemology of śabda
In Nya¯ya an authoritative instance of śabda must come from a source that satisfies
the criteria of trustworthiness. If textual re-use has epistemic purposes, therefore,
clarity about the identification of the source and its authoritativeness becomes
particularly relevant. The formal style of a quotation, moreover, may reflect an
appreciation or criticism of the source, in conformity with the assessment of a given
quotation as representing an accepted truth or a false tenet. To contextualize the
survey of quotations in the NM, some basic notions related to śabda epistemology
are discussed next.
2.1 Comprehension, Knowledge, and Their Object
In most cases I will leave untranslated the terms śabda and artha, in want of English
equivalents that can give justice to their technical and polysemous usages. Also, the





a. As a general orientation, in the present context śabda is to be
understood as “epistemic linguistic expression”, i.e., “linguistic expression having
the purpose of conveying knowledge”, and its artha as “object of epistemic
linguistic expression”. Although śabda is often rendered with “word” or, at best,
“linguistic expression”, and artha with “meaning”, such equivalents fail to convey
the epistemic import of these terms.
In the use of Sanskrit expressions such as śabdabodha, śabdārthapratīti,
śabdārthasampratyaya, padārthapratipatti, vākyārthapratipatti, etc., the distinction
between understanding words and knowing from words is not explicit and is
philosophically problematic. As noted by Matilal and Chakrabarti (1994, Introduc-
tion, pp. 9–11), in Nya¯ya literature the implied assumption is that verbal knowledge
(śabdabodha) is “knowledge derived from the words of a truth-teller”, rather than
“understanding of words”, although in English translations a tendency to render
śabda and artha in the latter context seems prevalent.
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The conflation of “comprehension of words” and “knowledge from words” that
we witness in Sanskrit literature, however, may not necessarily be a philosophical
flaw, if we consider how comprehension is a fundamental and inextricable part of
word-derived knowledge.4
2.2 Śabda in Nya¯ya
In NBh ad 1.1.7, śabda as an instrument of knowledge is defined as follows:
śabda is the instruction (upades´a) of a trustworthy instructor. It is of two
kinds, since it can have either a perceivable or an imperceivable artha.
āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ // sa dvividho dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthatvāt //
The trustworthiness of the source concerns language in general, so that it is
considered the ground for the validity of both common and Vedic language. Unlike
in Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯, in Nya¯ya the authority of the Veda is also founded on the
trustworthiness of their source:
And that [Veda] is a valid source of knowledge because its trustworthy
instructor is a valid source.
[…] tatprāmāṇyam āptaprāmāṇyāt //
A trustworthy instructor is defined as follows:
Trustworthy is the instructor (upadeṣṭṛ) who has directly experienced the
essential property (dharma) [of things], and is moved by the desire to describe
[things] as they are or they are not.
āptaḥ khalu sākṣātkṛtadharmā yathādṛṣṭasyādṛṣṭasya cikhyāpayiṣayā pra-
yukta upadeṣṭā /
Being grounded on the utterance of a trustworthy instructor, śabda can by no
means be considered permanent (nitya) by the Naiya¯yikas, since such an utterance
must have occurred at some point in time. Moreover, the relation between śabda and
artha is considered conventional, rather than natural, because it is based on
stipulations (saṅketa) established by divine or human beings (NBh ad 2.1.55–56).







sa¯, śabda is accepted ipso facto as natural and unalterable (Mīmāṃsāsūtra
1.1.5, see S´Bh, p. 28), so issues related to its development or aetiology are
deliberately ignored as pointless. The possibility of an author is irrelevant for its
4 The Nya¯ya andMı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯ traditions are counted by Julie Jack (1994) among exponents of what she labels
“Uniqueness School”, according to which there is a “uniqueness of knowing from words as a form of
knowledge,—its irreducibility either to perception or to inference […]” (1994, p. 165). In her essay she also
explores the problematic overlap of comprehension, judgment, and rational belief in verbal testimony.
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validity as an instrument of knowledge (which in Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯ is, specifically,
knowledge of dharma) and for its reality, i.e. its relation with a (mental or concrete)
object. The fixedness (nityatā) of such a relation necessarily implies the permanence
of śabda: the idea that śabda is ephemeral, common to most opponents of
Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯, is rejected in Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.18:
[śabda] must be permanent (nitya) [in relation to its artha], because [its]
appearance is for the purpose of [communicating with] someone else.
nityas tu syād darśanasya parārthatvāt //
If śabda were ephemeral, how could there be a continuous and consistent inter-
subjectivity of speakers and hearers, who comprehend a same expression in the
same way? To account for the sheer phenomenon of communication, the relation of
a śabda with an artha must be understood as stable and permanent.
In Bhartr
˙
hari’s philosophy of grammar, the ultimate reality (paramārtha) is a
non-dual śabdatattva, while all dualities and differences, including the distinction
into śabda and artha, appear as such only on the relative level of worldly
interactions (vyavahāra), and not in an absolute, real sense (see VP, 1.1).
Moreover, since the ultimate reality is śabda, true knowledge must be grounded
in it (VP, 1.131):
In this world there is no cognition without the comprehension of śabda. Every
knowledge shines as if penetrated by śabda.
na so ’sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte /
anuviddham iva jñānaṃ sarvaṃ śabdena bhāsate //
Jayanta sums up Bhartr
˙
hari’s philosophy of śabda as follows (NMVa II, pp.
156,19–157,1):
The non-dual Absolute, śabda, whose apparent differences are caused by traces
of a beginning-less nescience, is deceptively perceived as if related to the artha.
There is actually no signified thing separated from the signifier. Therefore, this
signified-signifier (vācyavācaka) subdivision, which is merely theoretical, is
nothing but nescience used as a tool to achieve awareness (vidyā).
The non-dual reality is śabda, so in Bhartr
˙
hari’s perspective Nya¯ya concepts such
as “trustworthy instructor” and “conventional meaning” are fictional ones. Also the
śabda-artha dichotomy is imaginary, since such duality does not exist in reality.
The segmentation of language into sentences, words, and phonemes is an artificial
operation, certainly useful for didactic purposes, but ultimately unreal.
2.4 The Oral and Written śabda
Traditionally, in India, śabda typically pertains to the realm of orality, while present
analyses of textual re-use mostly concern written literature.5 It is debatable to what
5 The distinction between the oral and written nature of śabda is not always made, e.g. in Saksena (1951,
pp. 38, 46), who interprets śabda as “verbal or written authority” or “verbal or written testimony”.
Bhattacharyya (1994, p. 76) points to an important difference, relevant to the context of the NM, between
spoken and written expressions: “Whether what is spoken endures when speaking is over is debatable;
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extent Jayanta used written sources or, rather, had them committed to memory when
he wrote the NM.
We also do not know how works such as the NS or the NBh were originally
composed and, if orally composed,when they began to be preserved and transmitted in
written form. However, judging from the epistemic importance of śabda and from
teaching and learning habits in traditional circles witnessed in modern times, it is
possible that the performative tradition of these works was mainly oral, and that they
were often memorized and taught without much reliance on writing.6 For easily
memorizable works, such as those in aphorisms and verses, the written record was
probably perceived as secondary. In other words, the authority of orally taught truths,
passed on from teacher to pupil, was probably superior to that of written ones.
As for large and digressive works such as the NM, they were more likely composed
in written form to begin with and were not commonly meant to be memorized in their
entirety. If this is the case, then, also the purpose of their written transmission must




ha¯ca¯rya Sva¯min, the learned copyist of the
oldest extant NMmanuscript, wrote in his colophon (P, fol. II 271r,1) that the NM had
been copied by him for teaching purposes (śiṣyān adhyāpayitum).
In any case, what is the epistemic role of written words for Jayanta? During his
refutation of the sphoṭa, he makes clear that written letters convey knowledge of the
artha indirectly, through an inferential process:
[…] Therefore the knowledge of the artha caused by the ink traits is based on
the inference of the phonemes (tasmād varṇānumānapurassaraiva rekhābhyo
’rthāvagatiḥ).
It thus seems theoretically acceptable to consider writing as leading to an instance
of epistemically effective śabda. Just like the perception of phonemes assists the
hearer in knowing from śabda, so can the perception of the ink traits assist an inference
of those very phonemes, which again assists the hearer in knowing from śabda. One
should also keep in mind that in Nya¯ya epistemology the possibility of knowing one
and the same object through different instruments of knowledge (pramāṇasamplava)
is acceptable (NMVa I, pp. 87–93). Furthermore, loud reading of a written source,
either by the teacher to the pupils or on one’s own, may also play a role in these
considerations.
3 Why did Jayanta Use Mīmāṃsā Sources?
Before Jayanta, in Nya¯ya sources, there had been no focus on the sentence, with
linguistic analyses mostly concerned with words and their link to external things. In
NM 5 (NMVa II, pp. 135,15–136,10), after examining various theories on sentence
Footnote 5 continued
what is written survives the act of writing. So all written words exist side by side […]”. Mohanty (1994, p.
31) suggests slight modifications in the utterer-conditions to make room for written testimony as śabda.
6 This, incidentally, would also explain the absence of a manuscript tradition of the NS independent of
the NBh in the early stage of the transmission.
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signification, Jayanta explained why he could not fully count on his own tradition on
this matter, and, implicitly, why he largely drew from Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯ theories:
[Objection:] The authors of the [Nyāya]sūtra and of the [Nyāya]bhāṣya have
not described the artha of the sentence anywhere: from where shall we learn
about the nature of the artha of the sentence, in order to expound it? [Counter-
objection:] […] this discipline of reasoning (ānvīkṣikī) is the science of means
of knowledge, not the science of the artha of the sentence.
[Objection:] Yet, if such is the case, why was the artha of the word taught,
[by the sūtra] “the artha of the word, however, is the individual thing, [its]
conformation (ākṛti), [its] universal character (jāti)” [NS 2.2.66]? [Counter-
objection:] This is a good point. That effort, however, was done by the author
of the [Nyāya]sūtra in order to establish the epistemic validity of śabda, and to
calm down protests that there is no contact between śabda and artha.
[Objection:] Yet, if this is the case, without an external object as the artha
of the sentence the epistemic foundation of the science would remain shaky,
so an effort should be done also in this area. [Counter-objection:] True. The
author of the [Nyāya]sūtra, by teaching only the artha of the word, meant to
take care [also] of that [artha of the sentence], so he did not teach the artha of
the sentence separately from that of the word. Therefore, his idea is that the
very artha of the word is the artha of the sentence; […] not that the artha of a
single word is the artha of the sentence; rather, the artha of several words is
the artha of the sentence.
In this passage, Jayanta stressed the epistemic focus of the Nya¯ya discipline.
Also, he apparently endorsed a realist epistemology in which the artha is external
and real (bāhya and vāstava). Lastly, he hinted at the strategy that he was going to
adopt to explain the transaction from word to sentence signification, on the one hand
respecting the letter of the NS (2.2.66), were the artha of the word is defined, and on






sa¯ theory of sentence
signification in the Nya¯ya system.7
4 Jayanta on Re-use and Originality
In the introductory verses of the NM (NMVa I, pp. 2–4), there are further indications
about Jayanta’s relation with his own tradition, a source of many of his re-uses. In
verse 4 he traced back the Nya¯ya tradition to sage Aks
˙
apa¯da, to whom the NS is
attributed, and in verses 7–9 he portrayed the tradition of Nya¯ya as the source of his
tenets, claiming for himself only the merit of having craftily re-ordered pre-existing
notions:8
7 On the rival Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯ theories of abhihitānvaya and anvitābhidhāna, and on Jayanta’s understanding
of these, see Kunjunni Raja (1963, p. 215) and Graheli (forthcoming).
8 Besides Jayanta, other well-known authors, such as Abhinavagupta, have portrayed themselves as mere
re-arrangers of traditional tenets. This typical self-description by three heterogeneous authors such as
Jayanta, Abhinavagupta, and Jı¯va Gosva¯min, is compared and related to the issue of novelty and
repetition in Graheli (2008).
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This superior essence was collected in the forests of the herbs of Nya¯ya. It was
extracted like butter from the milk of reasoning (ānvīkṣikī).9 How could I be
capable of even envisioning a new topic? Here my only concern is a variety
(vaicitrya) in arrangement of the [traditional] statements. Flower chaplets
crafted in the past can generate new interest if their very flowers are
recomposed on a new string.
After comparing the Nya¯ya system to a mighty tree cared for by Aks
˙
apa¯da,
Jayanta depicted himself as merely capable of a partial view of its full richness:
In fact, the tall tree of logic laid down by Aks
˙
apa¯da bears a load of fruits
oozing thick nectar. I will gently shake it, being uncapable of climbing on it.
[Thus] I cannot even see its full burden of riches.
To sum up, Jayanta planned his NM as a new structure built with tenets of a rich
pre-existing tradition, without any claim for originality, except for the arrangement
of the presentation.
5 The Argumentative Structure of the sphoṭa Section of NM 6
To examine the formal aspect of quotations and other re-uses, and to assess their
epistemic value, the context of the argumentative structure is crucial. The sphoṭa
section of NM 6 can be segmented in five argumentative steps: problem, thesis, first
antithesis, second antithesis, synthesis (sketched in Fig. 1).
● The topic is introduced by the philosophical problem (saṃśaya) that is going to
be dissected and settled: in the epistemic process of knowing something upon
hearing a linguistic expression, what is precisely the cause of knowledge of an
artha? Is it the ephemeral phonemes, as claimed in Nya¯ya (pratijñā, thesis)? Or
is it the indivisible entity called sphoṭa, as claimed in Vya¯karan
˙
a (pūrvapakṣa,




● The thesis is that phonemes are heard in sequence form words and sentences,
and thus they collectively cause knowledge of an object, though phonemes are
not permanent entities, but rather ephemeral ones.
● The first antithesis (pūrvapakṣa) is the solution of the problem as proposed in
Vya¯karan
˙
a, based on Bhartr
˙
hari’s holistic theory of meaning.
● The second antithesis (uttarapakṣa), which refutes the first one, is the solution of
the problem as proposed in Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯, largely based on Kuma¯rila’s atomistic
arguments.10
● The synthesis (siddhānta) consists of a minor modification of the Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯
arguments, to suit the Nya¯ya needs.
9 On the evolution from A¯nvı¯ks
˙
ikı¯ to Nya¯ya, see Preisendanz (2009).
10 “Atomism” and “holism” are here used as relative terms: Kuma¯rila has an atomistic perspective in
relation to Bhartr
˙
hari, but Nya¯ya views before Jayanta could be considered more atomist than Kuma¯rila’s.
On the use of the terms “holism” and “atomism” in relation to the context and composition principles and
to the Indian theories of meaning, see Matilal and Sen (1988, p. 84).
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The thesis and the two antitheses are in turn structured in a dialogic form of
progressive objections (pakṣa), counter-objections (pratipakṣa), and verdicts
(nirṇaya), so that in the first antithesis the objections and the verdicts are
Bhartr
˙
hari’s, while the counter-objections are (mainly) Kuma¯rila’s; in the second
antithesis the roles are reversed. The problem, the thesis, and the synthesis are
presented very concisely, while the two antitheses form the bulk of the section.
6 Re-uses in the NM
In the following, a selection of re-uses in defense and refutation of the sphoṭa are
documented in tabular form. For pragmatic reasons, I limited myself to re-uses of
the Śābarabhāṣya (S´Bh), Ślokavārttika (S´V), Ślokavārttikatātparyaṭīkā (S´VTT
˙
),11
and Vākyapadīya (VP). I ignored other sources such as the Bṛhatī (Br
˙
h) and the
Fig. 1 Argumentative structure of the sphoṭa section of NM 6
11 The debt of Jayanta to Um
˙
veka’s commentary is clear from many passages (see Sects. 7.1, 7.3, 7.6,
8.1, and 8.2 below). In a number of occasions (GBh, pp. 24,14, 149,4, 182,17), Jayanta’s commentator,





Sphoṭasiddhi (SphS).12 The list of re-uses presented here is a selection without
claims of exhaustiveness, as there are less evident re-uses which were discarded,
and other possible ones that may have escaped my attention.
Re-uses are sorted according to their sequence of occurrence in the NM and are
grouped in tables on the basis of the argumentative structure of the NM. Each table
is contextualized by a brief synopsis of the philosophical issues at stake, and
followed by some comments on the interesting features of the re-uses.
The first column contains the origin of the text re-used by Jayanta, with the reading
of themost reliable edition available tome (NS,NBh, S´VRa, S´VTT
˙
, VP; for quotations
from parts of the S´V not covered by S´VRa, I used S´VDva¯ instead); manuscript research
on these sources, although important for a conclusive assessment, was not feasible at
this stage. The second indicates the truth value (True/False) from the source viewpoint.
The third, fourth and fifth columns contain the re-use as found in the NM, sub-
classified into three segments: the re-use (sequentially numbered for cross-reference
purpose in this paper) preceded or followed by pre- and post-quote markers, when
present; re-used expressions, including also differently inflected stems, are shown in
bold face. Lastly, the sixth and the seventh columns indicate the truth value from the






All the NM passages reproduced in this paper refer to the pagination of NMVa.
Whenever other relevant witnesses13—namely NMGa, the Nyāyamañjarīgran-
thibhaṅga (GBh) and the important manuscripts (P and C)—have substantive
variants that differ from NMVa, such readings are either received in the text or
shown in critical notes below the tables.
7 First Antithesis: Re-use in Defense of the sphoṭa
7.1 Phonemes do not Cause Verbal Knowledge
Vaiya¯karan
˙
as maintain that phonemes cannot convey meaning, neither indepen-
dently nor collectively. Independent phonemes are just meaningless parts of words.
And if a word is considered a collection of phonemes, one must explain if they
function simultaneously or in sequence, and both options are not tenable.
The simultaneous existence of phonemes is ruled out in (1). The only possibility
of a simultaneous utterance of the phonemes composing a word would be that each




ana or to the SphS, there are some
instances that suggest some relation. The most striking one is the argument in NMVa, 150,13–14, where
eke, contrasted to apare, i.e. to Bhartr
˙




ana Mis´ra. The SphS, 89,4–6 reads: yathā
ratnaparīkṣiṇaḥ parīkṣamāṇasya prathamasamadhigamānupākhyātam anupākhyeyarūpapratyayopā-
hitasaṃskārarūpāhitaviśeṣāyāṃ buddhau krameṇa carame cetasi cakāsti ratnatattvam. The NM reads:
yathā ratnaparīkṣakāṇāṃ prathamadarśane ratnarūpam amalam prakāśamānam api punaḥ punaḥ
parīkṣamāṇānāṃ carame cetasi cakāsti niravadyaṃ ratnatattvam. The terminological similarity is
noteworthy. I could not find this jem/jeweller comparison in early sources, except for Va¯caspati Mis´ra’s
Tattvabindu (see TB, p. 70), for which there are arguments in favor of its posteriority in respect to the
NM.
13 A detailed explanation of the criteria for selecting relevant NM witnesses is provided in Graheli 2012b.
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of a group of speakers simultaneously utters one of the phonemes composing the
word, which is absurd (2). So, since a plurality of phonemes is uttered by a single
speaker, there must necessarily be a chronological sequence of phonemes in such an
utterance (3) (Table 7.1).
In (1), the link with Kuma¯rila’s statement is more evident in the variant of P, with
the reading sattā, in place of satām of the NM editions. For both opponents, as well
as for Jayanta, (1) denies the possibility of the simultaneous existence of the
phonemes forming a word. Although because of different reasons, for all of them it
is true that by itself a group of phonemes can not cause verbal knowledge. For
Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas śabda is permanent and thus an ontological simultaneity of phonemes
is acceptable, but phonemes need to be uttered and grasped in order to be effective,
and they are uttered and grasped in sequence. Also for Vaiya¯karan
˙
as śabda is
permanent, but an ontological simultaneity of phonemes is impossible because
phonemes are ultimately fictional entities. For Naiya¯yikas a simultaneous existence
of phonemes is simply not possible, due to the ephemeral nature of śabda.
In (2) the absurdity of many people simultaneously pronouncing different
phonemes of a same word is stated, and this is obviously shared by all. (3) is also
true for everyone involved here, because if a single person utters a series of
phonemes there must necessarily be a sequence.






























































































kramaḥ / NMVa II, p.
145,16–17
True Vya¯.
a satta¯] P; sata¯m
˙
NMGa NMVa; sato C • b tatra¯neka] P C NMGa; tatra ekada¯neka NMVa
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7.2 The Last Phoneme does not Cause Knowledge
Conceding that phonemes do not convey meaning, neither independently nor
collectively, the Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas argue that the perception of the last phoneme triggers
verbal knowledge, while assisted by the memory of previous phonemes (4). This,
however, is unacceptable, because such memory would be caused by a mental
disposition (saṃskāra), which would be in turn produced by the perception of each
phoneme. But memory and mental dispositions are not accepted as instruments of
valid knowledge, so this theory is not sound (Table 7.2).
The tenet expressed here is true for Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas, but false for Vaiya¯karan
˙
as.
7.3 A Cognition Made of Memory and Perception is Impossible
The passage quoted in (4) has been interpreted by Kuma¯rila by postulating a single,
variegated cognition embracing the memory of the past phonemes and the
perception of the last one, to avoid the issue raised by the Vaiya¯karan
˙
as, namely that
memory or mental dispositions of past phonemes cannot cause valid knowledge.
But, argue the Vaiya¯karan
˙
as, such a variegated and unitary cognition is also
impossible, because mental dispositions cannot possibly produce a single cognition
together with sense organs: mental dispositions cause recollections, while sense
organs cause perceptions (Table 7.3).
Table 7.2 The theory of the last phoneme is wrong
Source Truth
val.



































































































] C; om. NMGa NMVa; P n.a
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In (5) the two concepts of a variegated (citrarūpā) and cumulative (saṅka-
lanātmikā) cognition used by Kuma¯rila and Um
˙
veka as two alternative scenarios in
the theory of phonemes, seem to be reduced to a single one by Jayanta. The notion,
in any case, is false from the Vaiya¯karan
˙
as’s point of view.
7.4 Language Acquisition does not Justify the Existence of Phonemes
In defense of the theory of phonemes, Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas claim that language-produced
knowledge requires linguistic competence, which is acquired through the repeated
observation of a given pattern of phonemes in relation to their artha (6–7) (Table 7.4).
From the Vaiya¯karan
˙
as’ point of view it is false that language acquisition occurs
through phonemes.
7.5 The Theory of Phonemes is not Supported by Common Usage
People commonly say that “from śabdaweknow an artha”, where the use of the singular,
“from śabda”, matches the unity of the sphoṭa, not a plurality of phonemes (Table 7.5).
From the Vaiya¯karan
˙
a’s point of view it is correct that common usage favors the
sphoṭa, so (8) is true. The same argument was present in the source in the form of an
objection, and thus considered false there.















































True nanu (6) vyutpattivaśena s´abdo
’rthapratya¯yakata¯ma














































a pratya¯yakata¯m] P NMGa NMVa; gra¯hakata¯m C • b ye] P C; om. NMGa NMVa • c yatkramaka¯] P C
NMGa; yatkrama¯ NMVa • d yam] P C NMGa; yad NMVa • e tat] P NMGa NMVa; ta¯vat C
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7.6 Phonemes do not Qualify as śabda
To argue that śabda must by definition be audible, and that phonemes are audible
while the sphoṭa is not, does not make sense, because audibility is not an exclusive
character of phonemes (9) (Table 7.6).
TheMı¯ma¯m
˙
sakamayargue that although it is not anexclusivecharacteristic, it is still the
main one, and that the phonemes are audible while the sphoṭa is not. Yet, the characteristic
mark of śabda is not the mere audibility, but rather, its capacity to cause knowledge of the
artha (10–11). And such character belongs to the sphoṭa, not to phonemes.
People are erroneously led to think that phonemes are the cause of verbal
knowledge only because the sphoṭa manifests through articulated language, but
actually this idea is the result of a false-cause fallacy (12) (Table 7.6).
It is false, from the Vaiya¯karan
˙
a’s viewpoint, that the audibility of phonemes
qualifies them as śabda (9).
(10) and (11) are false for the Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas and true for the Vaiya¯karan
˙
as, who
have the interest of underscoring causality of cognition over audibility. (12), which
is true for the Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas, is rejected by Vaiya¯karan
˙
as as false.
7.7 The Theory of the sphoṭa is not Anti-economic
The Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas object that if the sphoṭa is manifested by phonemes, as
maintained by some Vaiya¯karan
˙
as (see above, footnote 12 on the SphS), a criticism
moved against the theory of phonemes stands also against the theory of the sphoṭa,
which basically adopts the theory of phonemes with its implications and on top of it
postulates a further entity (13–14) (Table 7.7).
The economy of the theory of phonemes in (13) and (14) is true for the
Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas, but false for the Vaiya¯karan
˙
as.
7.8 The sphoṭa is Manifested by Articulated Sound
According to other Vaiya¯karan
˙
as, however, this is not true: the sphoṭa is not
manifested by phonemes, but rather by phonetic sounds (dhvani), i.e., the combined
result of breath, articulation, etc., which in any case do not have ultimate ontological
status (15) (Table 7.8).
From here to the end of the first antithesis, all re-uses are of Vaiya¯karan
˙
a texts,
and thus true also in the sources.
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True nanu (9) śrotragrahaṇe hy
arthe śabdaśabdaḥ













(S´Bh 1.1.5, p. 54,12–13)



















































































a s´rotre] C, GBh; s´rautre P; s´rotraja NMGa NMVa
Table 7.7 The argument of economy is not valid
Source Truth
val.















































































7.9 The Sentence is the Linguistic Unity
Not only are phonemes unreal, even words are fictional abstractions (16). The
sentence is not a whole made of parts; rather, it belongs to a class of its own (17).
One may argue that there is a one-to-one correspondence between each phonemic
string and its respective artha, but this is not true; for instance (18), in unrelated
words like kūpa, yūpa, and sūpa, we see that some phonemes are identical, yet there
is no similarity in meaning (Table 7.9).
7.10 Words are Fictional Abstractions
The signification of words is thus a fictional device, like that of roots and suffixes.
Words are an abstraction, useful for didactic purposes, etc., but devoid of
ontological status (19–20) (Table 7.10).




























asya] P C; sphot
˙
asya ca NMGa NMVa











pada¯ni va¯kye ta¯ny eva varn
˙
a¯s























apy avayavair bhavitavyam /





















taraṃ hi narasiṃho na¯ma /
























a ’pi] P NMGa Va; ’pi ca C • b na tatra] P C NMGa; tatra na NMVa • c yu¯pasu¯pa¯na¯m] P C; su¯payu¯pa¯na¯m
NMGa NMVa • d aneka¯ks
˙
ara¯nugame] P; eka¯ka¯nugame C; eka¯ks
˙
ara¯nugame NMGa NMVa
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In (20), remarkably, while in C and GBh only the second hemistich of VP 3.1.1 is
present, in P and in the vulgata also the first hemistich is present. C and GBh, when
reading together, are evidence of an earlier stage of the NM transmission.

















































(NMVa II, p. 155,12–13)
iti True Vya¯.
a va¯kya¯t kalpanayaiva] C; va¯kya¯t kalpanayoddha¯rah
˙
P; va¯kya¯rthaparikalpanayaiva NMGa NMVa •
b apoddhr
˙



































vivartate / (NMVa II,
pp. 156,20–157,1)
True Vya¯.












True (22) va¯gru¯pata¯ tub tattvam
˙
sarvatrac pratyaye,










True yathoktam (23) vāgrūpatā ced
utkrāmed avabodha-
sya śāśvatī / na
prakāśaḥ prakāśeta sā
hi pratyavamarśinī //
(NMVa II, p. 157,5–6)
itid True Vya¯.
a advayam] P NMGa NMVa; om. C • b tu] P C; om. NMGa NMVa • c sarvatra] P C; sarva NMGa NMVa •
d iti] NMGa NMVa; om. P C
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7.11 Śabda is the Absolute, Indivisible Reality
The absolute reality is an indivisible śabda, while fictional differences are nothing
more than instruments to move towards an awareness of the śabda unity, or didactic
means to describe language (21–23) (Table 7.11).
7.12 The Threefold Manifestation of śabda
Even if in reality it is one and indivisible, śabdamanifests in the world of phenomena
in three aspects, vaikhārī, madhyamā, and paśyantī (24–27) (Table 7.12).
8 Second Antithesis: Re-use in the Refutation of the sphoṭa
With the exception of (40) below, in this section both re-uses and sources are
arguments presented from the Mı¯ma¯m
˙
saka viewpoint, so they express true concepts
both in the source and in the re-use.

















padam // (VP, 1.159)

















































pravartate // (VP, 1.166)






















anapa¯yinı¯ // (VP, 1.167)








a vyavasthita¯] P C; vyavasthitaiva NMGa NMVa • b vivr
˙
te] P NMGa Va; vidhr
˙
te C
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8.1 Sequential Phonemes Can Cause a Cumulative Cognition
In response to the Vaiya¯karan
˙
as’ objections (see Table 7.1), the Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas argue
that the sequential utterance of phonemes is not an issue: although phonemes are
uttered and grasped in sequence, they still are, collectively, the cause of verbal























































































































































iti / (NMVa II,
p. 160,10–12)
True Mı¯m.
a ekaya¯pi] P C; ekaya¯ NMGa NMVa • b vina¯] P C NMGa; om. NMVa • c a¯mukhı¯] P NMGa NMVa;
abhimukhı¯ C • d ity] P NMGa NMVa; om. C NMGa NMVa • e atra] P; om. C NMGa NMVa • f dvaya] P C;
dvaye NMGa NMVa • g graha] P C; om. NMGa NMVa
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knowledge. Instances of collective and sequential causes that bring about a
cumulative effect are well known, as in the case of drills to memorize verses (28) or
of intermediate sacrifices (29–30) in the economy of the main one (Table 8.1).
8.2 Dispositions and Memory in the Theory of Phonemes
The principle that the perception of the last phoneme triggers verbal knowledge, aided
by the memory of the previous phonemes (31), which was quoted and refuted by the
Vaiya¯karan
˙
as (see Table 7.2), actually stands valid. Objections on the capacity of
dispositions to produce verbal knowledge do not hold, if we understand “mental
disposition” as vāsanā, a quality of the self. Fromobservationwe know that perceptions
cause dispositions, and observation is a universal instrument of knowledge (33). And it
would be silly to ask “From where does such a mental disposition arise?”, because
everyone knows that mental dispositions are caused by perception (34) (Table 8.2).
(31) was also quoted above (see Table 7.2). In that occasion the line in favor of
atomism was not credited, unlike here. It could be because of the obviousness of the
source, but it is quite likely that the absence of credits had rhetoric implications:
the honorific tatrabhāvatā stresses the authoritativeness of the statement, while in





































































































am / (S´Bh ad
1.1.5, p. 53,1–2)
True (33) sarvatra no
darśanaṃ pramāṇam /
(NMVa II, p. 164,9)
True N.









tibı¯jam a¯dhatte iti /
(S´VTT
˙
, sphoṭa 100, found
also in PST
˙













a-] P C; ’ntyavarn
˙
a NMGa NMVa
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the previous case, where the argument is developed from the Vaiya¯karan
˙
as’
perspective, the authoritativeness of the source was meant to be undermined.
In (32) Jayanta gives a Vais´es
˙
ika twist to the word saṃskāra used by S´abara,
interpreting it as the quality of the self called vāsanā. The latter term is also used by
Um
˙
veka in the immediate context.
8.3 The Theory of Phonemes is More Economical
Alternatively, the Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas may concede that mental dispositions do not cause
knowledge of the artha directly. Yet, they can do it through memory: mental
dispositions of the past individual phonemes in sequence, together with the
perception of the last one, cause a new mental disposition that produces the memory
of the full word, which in turn causes the knowledge of the artha. When the
Vaiya¯karan
˙
as argue that this theory is anti-economical, the Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas, with
S´abara, reply that they are postulating a single entity (the mental disposition), while
the Vaiya¯karan
˙
as necessarily must postulate two (the sphoṭa and the mental
dispositions, through which the sphoṭa manifests) (35).
When the Vaiya¯karan
˙
as claim that, at least, they did not violate the law that mental
dispositions cause only memory, the Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas reply that they did indeed violate it,
becausewhen they dealwith the cause of themanifestation of the sphoṭa (seeTable 7.8),
they have to explain it in a similar way. In addition, they postulate the sphoṭa (36).
And the explanation of the gradual manifestation of the sphoṭa does not hold,
because knowledge of an artha is not a gradual, but rather a sudden phenomenon
(37) (Table 8.3).






































































True yathoktam (37) alpīyasāpi yatnena
śabdam uccaritaṃa
matiḥ / yadi vā naiva
gṛhṇāti varṇaṃ vā
sakalaṃ sphuṭam //










8.4 The Sequence is a Property of Phonemes
The sequence is just a property of phonemes, so no entity needs to be postulated in
addition to the phonemes (38) (Table 8.4).
8.5 The sphoṭa does not Qualify as śabda
Phonemes are the only basic linguistic elements, other fictional entities are not
required (39); śabda is said to be of two types, articulated and not articulated, and
the sphoṭa is neither of these two (40) (Table 8.5).
(40) is one of the rare cases, in NM 6, in which Jayanta quotes from his own
tradition.































































ram iṣyate // (NMVa II,
p. 169,12–15)
True Mı¯m.




















































a s´rotra] P C NMGa; s´rautra NMVa • b ca¯yam
˙
] P NMGa NMVa; tv ayam
˙
C
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8.6 The Smallest śabda Unity is the Phoneme
While in short words such as “cow” there is an impression of unity due to the
brevity of the sound, there are many long words, such as “Devadatta” where the
differences of sounds composing the word are clearly audible (41).
The Vaiya¯karan
˙
as proposed the reductio ad absurdum that if sentences are made
of words and words are made of phonemes, also phonemes must have parts. But
parts of phonemes are never perceived: a phoneme is either fully perceived, or it is
not perceived at all (42) (Table 8.6).



























































matiḥ / yadi vā naiva
gṛhṇāti varṇaṃ vā
sakalaṃ sphuṭam //




hy etat] P; uktam hy etat C; tatha¯ hy uktam etat NMVa • b uccaritam
˙




























































































































































ad 1.1.1, p. 2,17–18)




















































































(NBh ad 1.1.1, p. 8,7–
9)





























u P • b ca] C NMGa NMVa; om. P •
c pravr
˙
ttir] C NMGa NMVa; gatih
˙
P • d parı¯ks
˙
eti] P C; parı¯ks
˙
a¯ ceti NMGa NMVa • e ma¯tram] C; om. P

















am idam P • h vica¯rah
˙
] C NMGa NMVa; om. P
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9 Re-use from Nyāya Sources
In Tables 9.1–3 there is a small sample of re-uses from the NS and the NBh, as a
term of comparison with the above-listed sources from other traditions. In Table 9.1,
three quotations of the NS are shown, as an example of the many occurring in the
NM. In Table 9.2, there are some re-uses from the NBh without an explicit mention
of the NBh author. Finally, in Table 9.3, a few NBh re-uses with an explicit
attribution are listed.
10 Conclusions
In Tables 10.1, 10.2 and 10.3 some characteristics of all the above re-uses are
summarized for a better appreciation of specific patterns. The sequential number is
shown in bold typeface when the re-use is a quotation. The context shows how re-uses
constitute the back-bone of the whole argumentation in favor and against the sphoṭa. It
would be possible, indeed, to make sense of the main structure of the sphoṭa section
just by following the concatenation of arguments present in the quotations. The
sequence of the arguments, however, differs from that found in previous sources, so
Jayanta’s claim of his role as a re-arranger seems corroborated by this survey.
In the re-uses surveyed here there are always three subjects involved: besides
Jayanta himself (the Nya¯ya exponent), in fact, a dialog is staged between a symbolic
re-user and the utterer of a re-used source, in the present case alternatively the
Vaiya¯karan
˙
a or the Mı¯ma¯m
˙

































True (53) pramāṇena khalv
ayaṃ jñātārtham
upalabhya tam
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Objections (Mīmāṃsaka) and Counter-objections (Vaiyākaraṇa)
(1) Kuma¯rila Rejection of
simultaneity of
phonemes
Vya¯. True True True
(2) Kuma¯rila Rejection of
simultaneity of
phonemes







Vya¯. True True True







(5) Kuma¯rila Variegated or
cumulative sonic
image







Vya¯. True False True








(8) S´abara Common usage of
language supports
the sphoṭa
Vya¯. False True False
(9) S´abara Phonemes are audible,
thus they are śabda
Vya¯. True False True
(10) S´abara śabda is the cause of
knowledge of the
artha, i.e. the sphoṭa
Vya¯. False True False
(11) Um
˙
veka śabda is the cause of
knowledge of the
artha, i.e. the sphoṭa
Vya¯. False True False
(12) S´abara The phonemes as
signifiers
Vya¯. True False True






















mentioned, and in others clearly identifiable in the flow of the argument, according
to his role in the debate either as proponent (pakṣin) or opponent (pratipakṣin).
Although the Mı¯ma¯m
˙
saka role in the staged debate is that of presenting a second
antithesis (uttarapakṣa) and not a final verdict (siddhānta) one cannot fail to notice
how Jayanta’s views are very close to the Mı¯ma¯m
˙
saka’s, so much so that in the
present list of re-uses, insofar as the truth value of the statements, Jayanta almost
invariably agrees with the Mı¯ma¯m
˙
saka. In these conclusive tables, the truth values
seen from Jayanta’s viewpoint are in bold face, together with the truth values of






























hari Phonemes and words
are fictional
abstractions
Vya¯. True True False
(17) Bhartr
˙
hari The sentence is not a
whole made of parts
Vya¯. True True False
(18) Bhartr
˙
hari Phonemes have no
independent
meaning
Vya¯. True True False
(19) Bhartr
˙
hari Words are fictional
abstractions
Vya¯. True True False
(20) Bhartr
˙

































hari The three-fold śabda Vya¯. True True False
(25) Bhartr
˙
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(28) Kuma¯rila Phonemes in
sequence produce a
cumulative effect












Mı¯m. True True True
















qualities of the self
Mı¯m. True True True
(33) S´abara Perception is the
main instrument
of knowledge

























































t (Mı¯m.) True True True
(41) Kuma¯rila The smallest śabda
unity is the
phoneme
Mı¯m. True True True
(42) Kuma¯rila The smallest śabda






































apa¯da Knowledge of the

























Uncredited re-uses from the NBh
(46) Va¯tsya¯yana The syntax of NS
1.1.1
Nya¯. True True True





Nya¯. True True True
(48) Va¯tsya¯yana Inference is used
to solve doubts
Nya¯. True True True




Nya¯. True True True
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Throughout the NM, when not explicitly credited to the author, quotations are
almost invariably introduced by tad uktam, or, more rarely, yathoktam. The
overwhelming percentage of quotations thus introduced is in verse or sūtra form.
This tad uktam pre-quote expression can be considered Jayanta’s marker for a
precise quotation, so much so that it may be used as a valuable clue to identify
quotations from undetermined or lost works. Also, it is a signal that the specific





symbolized in the quotation. Unlike S´abara and Kuma¯rila, Bhartr
˙
hari is never
explicitly credited. Since Jayanta’s views are certainly closer to the Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas’s,
such explicit credits could by themselves be not only tokens of respect, but also of
the trustworthiness of the source.
The almost invariable concomitance of the tad uktam formula with quoted verses
and aphorismsmay have several reasons. It is possible that verses weremore suited for
quotation purposes, for mnemonic reasons, and that therefore Jayanta thinks more
appropriate to introduce them with an explicit “so it was said”. It is also possible that
verses and aphorisms, since they were more easily memorized and thus faithfully
transmitted, enjoyed a special status as śabdapramāṇa in Jayanta’s perspective.
It is remarkable how differently re-uses from Nya¯ya sources are treated. First of
all, in these cases the tad uktam pre-quote is not systematically present anymore.
There is a substantial amount of uncredited quotations from the NBh, which is all in
prose, except for rare passages (see Table 10.3). Perhaps these passages were so
well known to Jayanta and his audience to make irrelevant the necessity of credits,
or perhaps in Jayanta’s understanding only versified passages were worthy of
credits, but in some cases they could also be unconscious re-uses creeping in the
NM.14 In the context of versification, I found (48) particularly interesting, where a
prose passage of the NBh is integrated and completed in metrical form by Jayanta.
In relation to re-use in Nya¯ya literature, in any case, it seems that the impact of
the oral tradition, and thus of massive portions of works committed to memory,
must be taken into account.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
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